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Abstract
A potentially troubling characteristic of the U.S. banking industry is the
geographic concentration of many community banks’ offices and operations.  If
geographic concentration of operations exposes banks to local market risk, we should
observe a widespread decline in their financial performance following adverse economic
shocks.  By analyzing the performance of a sample of geographically concentrated U.S.
community banks exposed to severe unemployment shocks in the 1990s, we find that
banks are not particularly sensitive to local economic deterioration.  Indeed, performance
at banks in counties that suffered economic shocks is not statistically different from
performance at banks that did not suffer economic shocks.
These findings suggest that an additional supervisory tax such as higher capital
requirements on banks with geographically concentrated operations is unwarranted.
They also suggest that such banks are unlikely to reduce risk significantly through
geographic expansion.  Finally, bank supervisors should not rely systematically on
county-level labor data to forecast or even to explain contemporaneous community bank
performance.  Rising county-level unemployment rates are consistent with both healthy
and deteriorating bank performance. 
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Key Words:  community bank, bank performance, idiosyncratic risk, local market
risk, geographic diversification, economic shocks, county
unemployment1
I.  Community Bank Exposure to Local Market 
Because of the way that U.S. banking laws evolved, many U.S. community banks
have geographically concentrated offices and operations.  Historically, national and state
banking laws prevented banks from branching into other counties and states.
Justification for such legislation was to promote sound and stable banking markets by
limiting competitive pressures on existing banks and to prevent an excessive
concentration of financial power.
1  Such laws, however, left banks vulnerable to local
economic downturns.  Despite liberalized branching laws, thousands of small banks with
geographically concentrated offices remain.  As of June 2000, 62 percent of U.S.
commercial banks derived all of their deposits from offices in a single county.
2  Many
banks, therefore, remain potentially vulnerable to local economic downturns.
Portfolio theory suggests that geographically concentrated banks may be riskier
than more geographically diversified banks because of heightened credit risk.  Banks
with geographically concentrated lending activities have difficulty diversifying credit risk
because of the high monitoring costs involved in booking loans to customers in distant
locations.  Bank performance may deteriorate significantly when the local economy
suffers a recession or a negative economic shock because its customer base is affected by
similar economic events.  We call this risk local market risk.  A bank with a more
diversified loan base would be affected less severely. 
Alternatively, banks with geographically concentrated operations may not be
particularly vulnerable to local market risk.  Although research has shown that
community banks tend to lend to firms and individuals nearby (Laderman 1991), such
                                                
1 Berger et. al. (1995), Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997.
2 Summary of Deposits 2000, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.2
banks may engage in financial diversification through loan sales and participations,
making their loan portfolios less dependent on local conditions.  In addition, many local
firms that banks lend to may be diversified from local shocks by selling their products to
different regions of the U.S. or to different nations altogether.  A local downturn,
therefore, may not affect many of the bank’s loan customers.  The vulnerability of
community banks to local economic conditions, then, is an empirical issue.
We test the hypothesis that community banks with geographically concentrated
operations are vulnerable to county-level economic shocks by comparing bank
performance before and after a local unemployment shock.  We find that about 20
percent of community banks respond negatively to local economic shocks, but the
negative response is not significantly different from a randomly chosen peer group of
banks that were not exposed to local economic shocks.  In short, banks with
geographically concentrated offices do not appear to have significant exposure to local
market risk, but they do appear to be exposed to significant idiosyncratic risk.
These findings have three policy implications.  First, bank supervisors need not
require geographically concentrated community banks to take additional measures
relative to more diversified banks to reduce local market risk.  Second, as community
banks take advantage of the recent relaxation of U.S. branching restrictions, risk
reduction through geographic diversification is likely to be small.  Third, bank
supervisors should not rely systematically on county economic data to conduct bank
surveillance.  County economic data add few marginal benefits in predicting or even
explaining community bank performance.  3
II.  Literature Review
Few researchers have addressed the vulnerability of community banks to local
market risk.  Meyer and Yeager (2001) find little evidence to support the hypothesis that
small banks located in the Federal Reserve’s Eighth District are vulnerable to local
economic downturns.  Specifically, they find that county economic data were weakly
correlated with small rural bank performance between 1990 and 1997.  Meyer and
Yeager’s conclusions, however, rely heavily on the quality of local economic data.  Noisy
economic data may disguise the true correlation.  In addition, the authors look at the
average relationship between local economic data and bank performance variables
without separately analyzing the outliers.  The relationship between bank performance
and county economic conditions may be nonlinear such that banks can reasonably
manage minor economic shocks but performance deteriorates rapidly as the economic
shocks become more severe.
Emmons, Gilbert and Yeager (2001) examine the risk-reduction effects from
simulated community bank mergers.  They find that bank risk is reduced significantly as
merged banks grow larger, but the risk reduction is driven by scale effects, not
geographic diversification.  Indeed, the degree of geographic diversification in the post-
merger bank does not contribute significantly to risk reduction.  The results suggest that
community bank idiosyncratic risk is significant but local market risk is not.
Several researchers have focused on a broader geographic area, detecting a
correlation between regional economic conditions and bank performance.  Zimmerman
(1996) finds that in the early 1990s banks in southern California performed worse than
those in the Central Valley and northern California because southern California was hit4
much harder by the 1990-1991 recession.  Neely and Wheelock (1997) find that bank
earnings are still correlated significantly with state economic activity despite recent
branching restrictions.
A few researchers argue that the vulnerability of banks to regional economic
markets has declined over the last few decades, either because banks or regional
economies have become more diversified.  Gunther and Robinson (1999) find that banks
faced less risk from variations in regional economic performance in 1996 than in 1985 in
part because of industry diversification at the state level.  Petersen and Rajan (2000) find
that community banks increased their lending to more distant borrowers over the last few
decades.  In particular, the distance between small firms and lenders grew from an
average of 51 miles in the 1970s to 161 miles in the 1990s.  The authors attributed most
of the gain to improvements in gathering and analyzing information.  Banks reduced the
importance of person-to-person contact by relying increasingly on financial statements
and credit reports to evaluate potential borrowers.  Credit markets have also become more
efficient.  Banks can engage more easily in financial diversification through loan
participations or collateralized mortgage obligations, which offset some of their credit
risk.  Because of the decreased costs to diversification without geographic expansion,
banks may have reduced or eliminated the risk exposures that previous intrastate
branching restrictions imposed.
III.  Selection of Banks and Counties with Economic Shocks
We wish to analyze the performance of geographically concentrated banks that
were exposed to large negative local economic shocks.  Unlike Meyer and Yeager
(2001), our analysis is not distorted by potential random variations in the unemployment5
data because we focus exclusively on banks that were exposed to severe local economic
shocks rather than focusing on all banks and all counties within a geographical area.  If
the performance of community banks located in counties that suffered significant
economic distress show little correlation with local economic activity, then we can be
quite confident that local market risk is not significant at community banks. 
The first step is to identify counties that suffered economic shocks sometime
between the fourth quarter of 1990 and the third quarter of 1998.  The sample does not
precede 1990 because reliable county labor data are not available.  This time period
allows observations of bank performance up to three quarters before and two years after
the economic shock to give a reasonable time period to compare pre- and post-shock
performance.
We define local economic shocks two different ways, using a 50 percent change
rule and a total cost rule.  The 50 percent change rule requires a 50 percent or greater
increase in the seasonally-adjusted county unemployment rate between the rate in a given
quarter and the average rate over the following year, given that the initial unemployment
rate was 6 percent or higher.  The six-percent cutoff captures the assumption that
unemployment rates below this level represent a fully employed or more-than-fully
employed labor force so that increases in unemployment rates up to 6 percent are not as
costly as unemployment rate increases above 6 percent.  Suppose, for example, that the
seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 1991 was 6 percent.  The
average unemployment rate in 1992 had to be at least 9 percent to qualify as a shock.  
The 50 percent change rule has two shortcomings.  First, it misses counties that
had large unemployment rate increases but began with unemployment rates under six6
percent.  A county would not be classified as experiencing a shock, for example, if the
unemployment rate rose from 5 percent to 10 percent.  Another shortcoming is that the 50
percent change rule requires counties with initially high unemployment rates to past a
stricter test to be counted as an economic shock than counties that begin with lower
unemployment rates.  That is, an increase in the unemployment rate from 6 percent to 9
percent qualifies as a shock but an initial unemployment rate of 7 percent must increase
to 10.5 percent to qualify.  In fact, a rate increase from 7 percent to 10 percent may be
more harmful than an increase from 6 percent to 9 percent.
The total-cost rule is a more comprehensive definition of an economic shock
which accounts for the shortcomings of the 50 percent change rule.  We define a total
cost variable (TC) based on the following formula, and define a shock as one in which
TC exceeds six:
2 1 TC TC TC   (1)
where TC1 =  max [min [Ut+1, 6] - Ut, 0] 
TC2 = (max [Ut+1, 6] – 6)
1.5  –  (max [Ut, 6] – 6)
1.5
Ut = current quarter’s unemployment rate
Ut+1 = average unemployment rate over the next four quarters
Given this definition, the first cost component, TC1, rises linearly as the unemployment
rate rises to 6 percent, the implicit natural rate of unemployment.  If Ut is 4 and Ut+1 is 9,
TC1 is two (6 – 4).  Because we assume that the hardships of unemployment on a bank
increase as unemployment rises above the natural rate, the second cost component, TC2,
increases exponentially with a rise in the unemployment rate above 6 percent.  A rise in
the rate from 4 percent to 9 percent results in a value for TC2 of 5.2 ((9 – 6)
1.5), for a total
cost of 7.2 (2 + 5.2).  Figure 1 illustrates the calculation of total cost given an initial7
unemployment rate of 4 percent.  If the leading unemployment rate exceeds 8.52 percent,
the change qualifies as an economic shock.  Finally, because the first component of TC2
calculates the cost of unemployment assuming that the initial unemployment rate was 6
percent, the second component of TC2 subtracts the amount by which the initial
unemployment rate exceeds 6 percent.  If, for example, the unemployment rate rises from
8 percent to 11 percent, TC1 is zero, but TC2 is (11 – 6)
1.5 – (8 – 6)
1.5, or 8.35.  This
increase also qualifies as a shock.
Although our definition of an economic shock is somewhat arbitrary, we define a
shock such that by most subjective measures, a large change in the county unemployment
rate occurs over a relatively short period of time.  We are confident, therefore, that we are
isolating counties that have suffered serious setbacks; the changes in unemployment rates
are not driven simply by noisy data.  We assessed the vulnerability of community banks
to local economic shocks using both the total-cost rule and the 50 percent change rule.
Because the total-cost definition of a shock is more sophisticated and because the results
from both rules were similar, we report only the results from the total-cost definition of
an economic shock.
After defining an economic shock, we selected a sample of counties from across
the U.S. that suffered an economic shock some time in the 1990s.  To reduce the sample
size to a manageable level and to ensure a national sample, we selected counties from
only one state in each of the nine Census divisions.
3  The states (arbitrarily) chosen were
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Oklahoma and
                                                
3 The nine Census Divisions are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
South Atlantic Division, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific.8
Pennsylvania.  If a county suffered from two or more economic shocks in the 1990s, we
used the time period of the first shock.
Additional qualifications were placed on the selection of counties even if they
experienced an economic shock.  Each county chosen had to have at least two
headquarter banks with all of their deposits derived from offices in that county in every
quarter throughout the 1990s.
4  These criteria allowed us to identify banks with
geographically concentrated operations and to exclude banks with merger activity outside
of county boundaries because such mergers may make a bank less vulnerable to a county
economic shock.  The requirement that each county have at least two geographically
concentrated banks reduced the possibility that random bank-specific factors affected
bank performance measures, and it allowed us to conduct intra-county bank comparisons.
Finally, the restrictions ensured that each bank selected from a given county existed at
least one year before and two years after the economic shock so that we could adequately
measure the bank’s performance before and after the shock.
 Our selection criteria produced 103 banks from 38 counties.  The counties are
listed in Table 1 with the number of banks chosen from each county, the seasonally-
adjusted county unemployment rates both before and after the economic shocks, the total
cost of the shock, and the county labor force in the quarter of the shock.  Despite
screening the sample on all nine Census divisions, just five states—California, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa and Oklahoma—are represented in the final sample.  Most of the shocks
occurred in Georgia counties in 1990 and 1991 during the U.S. recession, though every
year between 1990 and 1997 except 1994 is represented.
                                                
4 We used Summary of Deposit data from the FDIC and OTS to isolate banks with all deposits in offices in
a single county.9
IV.  Bank Performance Following Local Economic Shocks
The vulnerability of geographically concentrated banks to local market risk can be
measured by comparing pre- and post-shock bank performance.  We must specify the
criteria to assess bank performance.  We focus primarily on asset quality measures
because, all else equal, geographically concentrated banks are likely to have higher credit
risk than more diversified banks.  Three ratios that bank examiners routinely use to assess
asset quality are provision expense to total assets (earnings set aside to cover loan losses),
nonperforming loans to total assets (loans 90 days or more past due and nonaccruing),
and loan losses to total assets (charge-offs less recoveries).  We also examine one
common income measure, return on assets (ROA), which is net income divided by assets.
Earnings may capture performance trends broader than asset quality trends.  Although
theoretical reasons exist to believe that a bank’s liquidity position will deteriorate after a
local economic shock, we exclude liquidity ratios because the common ratios from the
call reports are too blunt to draw any meaningful conclusions.  Liquidity ratios often fail
to capture important information about a bank’s true liquidity exposure.
We first assess the vulnerability of banks exposed to economic shocks by
aggregating the accounting data of the sample banks in a given county.  Aggregation of
the banks has the advantage of dampening idiosyncratic bank factors and allows us to
more easily illustrate the impact of economic shocks on bank performance by reducing
the number of sample banks from 103 to 38. 
To control for factors such as bank location and the state of the business cycle, we
compare changes in the four key bank performance ratios relative to peer bank ratios.
The peer bank ratios for a sample bank in a given county are asset-weighted averages of10
ratios from banks with less than $250 million in assets with headquarters in the same
state as the sample bank, excluding banks located in the same counties as the sample
banks.  Each of the sample banks has less than $250 million in assets; therefore, the peer
banks are selected to be similar in size so that the peer ratios are not influenced by
financial data from larger banks.  Subtracting the peer banks’ ratios from the sample
banks’ ratios in a given quarter controls for location and business cycle factors.  For
example, Greene County, Georgia suffered an adverse economic shock in the fourth
quarter of 1991.  The aggregated ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans of the three
sample banks in that county was 4.70 percent in 1991:4 and 2.54 percent a year earlier.
In contrast, nonperforming loans at peer Georgia banks were 1.77 percent in 1991:4 and
1.73 percent a year earlier.  The change in nonperforming loans at Greene County banks
relative to peer banks is (4.70 – 1.77) – (2.54 – 1.73), or 2.12 percentage points.  In other
words, we measure bank deterioration following an economic shock relative to the
deterioration of peer banks.
To illustrate the diversity in county-aggregated bank performance before and after
an economic shock, we plot in Figure 2 the performance ratios of two of the worst
performing banks (Greene and Meriwether, Georgia) and two of the best performing
banks (Lake California, and Calhoun Illinois) following economic shocks.  Time period
‘0’ is the quarter of the shock.  The vertical axis represents the difference between the
sample bank ratios and peer bank ratios.  Banks in Greene and Meriwether counties react
to the economic shock with falling ROA, increased provision expense and higher
nonperforming loans and loan losses.  Calhoun County banks seemed to have suffered
deteriorating performance before the economic shock.  Earnings and asset quality11
deteriorated at least a year prior to period 0.  Perhaps Calhoun County suffered an
economic or idiosyncratic shock prior to the fourth quarter of 1990 that our sample
excludes.  Finally, Lake County appears unfazed and even thrives during and after the
economic shock.  Earnings and asset quality remain strong and even improve somewhat
for the two years following the shock.
Rather than plotting and analyzing time series graphs for all 38 counties (and 103
banks), we need a way to synthesize and quantify the impact of the shocks on bank
performance.  For each performance measure, we compute the average ratio differences
between the sample banks and peer banks for the nine quarters during and following the
economic shock (time periods 0 through 8) and subtract from that value the average
differences between the sample banks and peer banks one year prior to the shock (time
periods –4 through –1).
5  For example, the average difference in nonperforming loans
between sample and peer banks after the shock in Greene County is 2.84 percent, while
the average difference in nonperforming loans between sample and peer banks one year
before the shock is 1.29 percent.  We conclude, therefore, that the local economic shock
in Greene County caused nonperforming loans to rise by 1.55 percentage points (2.84 –
1.29) relative to peer banks.  This method assumes that bank performance reacts
contemporaneously with economic performance, an assumption that seems to hold quite
well for most of the banks and counties as observed in time series plots.  The
performance ratio differences before and after the economic shock are listed in Table 2
along with the relative rank of each of the county-aggregated banks.  Counties are listed
                                                
5 We also constructed rankings using the quarter before and the quarter after as the dividing dates to
compute the deterioration in asset quality.  Although the rankings were slightly altered, the same clusters of
banks remained in the top and bottom portions of the rankings.12
by the sum of ranks of the four performance ratios, ranked from the most affected banks
to the least affected banks.
The vulnerability of banks to local economic shocks varies widely across the
sample.  Greene County ranks first in provision expense, nonperforming loans and ROA,
and second in loan losses to receive the top ranking overall.  Georgia counties occupy the
top seven spots in the list.  At the bottom of the list are banks from McIntosh County in
Oklahoma, Lake County in California and Calhoun County in Illinois.  In each of these
cases asset quality improves and earnings are either unchanged or improved after the
economic shock.  As Figure 2 illustrates, however, the results from Calhoun County are
driven by an apparent recovery from a previous shock prior to the county economic shock
that we capture in the third quarter of 1992.
Besides knowing the relative vulnerability of geographically concentrated banks
to local economic shocks, we also would like a measure of economic significance.  Just
how big are the differences in performance ratios before and after the economic shocks?
Provision expense at Green County banks relative to peer banks, for example, increases
80 basis points after the shock; is this a large increase?
Bank examination ratings guide our assessments of large changes in bank
performance ratios.  CAMELS is an acronym that stands for Capital adequacy, Asset
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity (to market risk).  Each time a
bank is examined, regulators assign a composite rating and an individual rating to each of
the CAMELS components.  CAMELS ratings range from 1 (the safest banks) to 5 (the
riskiest banks).  Banks with composite ratings of 1 and 2 are considered to exhibit
“strong” and “satisfactory” performances, respectively.  Banks that fall below a 2 rating13
may prompt supervisory action, which could include a board resolution, a memorandum
of understanding, a written agreement, or a cease and desist order.  Hence, regulators
consider a drop from a 2 rating to a 3 rating to be a significant change.
Median differences in bank performance ratios between 2- and 3-rated banks
serve as our benchmarks for evaluating economic significance.  To be consistent with our
sample, we constructed the benchmarks using examination ratings and performance ratios
of banks with less than $250 million in assets in the states of California, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, and Oklahoma between 1990 and 1997.  We used only bank performance ratios at
the time of the bank examination instead of using all performance ratios for 2- and 3-
rated banks to avoid endogeneity issues that might arise if supervisors required 3-rated
banks to improve performance.  Inclusion of all the ratios would potentially decrease the
differences between 2- and 3-rated banks.  Table 3 lists the median performance ratios for
2- and 3- rated banks.  For banks with a CAMELS asset-rating of 3 (the ‘A’ rating), the
median provision expense was 16 basis points higher, nonperforming loans were 117
basis points higher, and loan losses were 32 basis points higher than 2-rated banks.  For
banks with a CAMELS earnings rating of 3 (the ‘E’ rating), ROA was 31 basis points
lower than 2-rated banks.
To obtain our measures of economic significance, we divide the difference in
each performance ratio in Table 2 by the benchmark differences between CAMLES 2-
and 3-rated banks.  A ratio of one or greater means that the performance ratio relative to
the peer group deteriorated more than the benchmark difference between a 2- and 3-rated
bank.  For example, provision expense increased 81 basis points at our sample banks in
Greene County, 4.3 times the benchmark difference.  Nonperforming loans increased 1.214
times, loan losses 1.5 times, and ROA 1.93 more than the benchmark differences.  Asset
quality and earnings, therefore, deteriorated more than enough relative to peer banks to
increase Greene County asset quality and earnings CAMELS ratings by at least one full
point, an economically significant change.  Economically significant differences in ratios
are shaded in gray in Table 2.
A relatively small amount of banks appear to be affected by the local economic
shocks.  Table 2 shows that 13.8 percent (21 of 152) of the changes in county-aggregated
bank performance measures were economically significant.  Looked at another way, just
six of the 38 counties (15.8 percent) had two or more performance ratios with
economically significant changes.
In addition to analyzing the county-aggregated bank performance, we analyzed
each of the 103 sample bank’s performance separately.  The analysis was identical to that
of the county-aggregated analysis except that we calculated and ranked the pre-shock and
post-shock differences between performance ratios on a bank-by-bank basis.  The
sensitivity of banks to local economic shocks increased slightly relative to the county-
aggregated results.  Indeed, 19.7 percent (81 of 412) of the performance measures
showed economically significant deterioration.  In addition, 19.4 percent of the banks had
two or more performance ratios with economically significant changes.  In sum, up to
about 20 percent of the sample banks seemed to react significantly to local economic
shocks.
The relatively weak correlation between county economic shocks and bank
performance could be due to survivorship bias.  Local economic shocks may lead banks
to fail, which eliminates them from our sample.  Fortunately, banking data allow us to15
investigate the importance of this bias.  We obtained a list from the FDIC of every bank
that failed between 1990 and 1999 in each of the nine states.
6  In total there were 109
bank failures, nearly half of which were in California.  We then screened those banks on
two criteria: each bank had to have all of its deposits in a single county just before failure,
and it had to have its headquarters in a county that suffered an economic shock in the
same year or the year prior to the failure.  Although 62 banks passed the deposit screen,
just one bank from Marion County, Mississippi passed both screens.  We conclude,
therefore, that survivorship bias is not influencing our results.
V.  Bank Performance in the Absence of Economic Shocks
Although we have demonstrated that up to one-fifth of the sample banks in the
counties that experienced economic shocks experienced significant economic
deterioration, we still must show that this deterioration was more than the deterioration
that we would observe from banks in a randomly chosen set of counties that did not
experience economic shocks.  Arguing that perhaps 20 percent of community banks with
geographically concentrated offices are vulnerable to local economic shocks is potentially
misleading because it assumes that banks in counties without economic shocks did not
suffer any adverse economic consequences.
We paired each of the 38 counties that experienced an economic shock with a
matching county from the same state that did not suffer an economic shock.  Matched
counties had to have a total cost of unemployment as defined by the total cost rule less
than two for each quarter between 1990 and 1997.  This requirements eliminates the
possibility that a matched county suffered an economic shock just before or after the
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quarter the matched sample bank suffered the shock.  In addition, matched counties had
to have at least two banks with all their deposits derived from offices in a single county.
Finally, banks in matched counties had to exist throughout the entire sample period to
avoid performance measure distortions from merger activity.  The 38 matched counties
are listed in Table 4 along with their current and leading unemployment rates as of the
date of the economic shock of their paired sample counties.  As the table illustrates, each
of the matched counties had a total cost of unemployment less than two.  The 38 matched
counties contain a total of 135 community banks.
As with the sample banks, we wish to assess bank performance after the “no-
shock” date relative to bank performance prior to the no-shock date, where the no-shock
date is the date of the economic shock of the paired sample county.  We first aggregated
the accounting data of the banks in the matched counties to reduce idiosyncratic risk and
simplify the exposition of the results.  Next, we constructed a peer group in the identical
manner that was used for the banks that experienced county economic shocks, except that
we also excluded the matched banks from the peer group.  We then computed for each
aggregated bank the difference between the matched bank ratio and peer bank ratio for
each of the four performance ratios.  We averaged the differences in time periods 0 to 8
and subtracted from that the average differences in time periods –4 to –1. The
performance ratio differences before and after the “no-shock” date are listed in Table 5
along with the relative rank of each of aggregated banks in the counties.  Counties are
listed by the sum of ranks of the four performance ratios, ranked from the most affected
banks to the least affected banks.17
 Surprisingly, the matched banks show some sensitivity to the “no-shock” dates,
suggesting that some of the deterioration of the sample banks in shock counties is driven
by factors other than the economic shocks.  Fully 11.8 percent (18 of 152) of the
performance measures of matched banks exhibit economically significant deterioration as
measured by the CAMELS benchmarks, compared with 13.8 percent for the sample
banks.  Matched banks in just three of the 38 counties (7.9 percent), however, have two
or more performance ratios with economically significant deterioration, compared with
six of 38 sample banks.
Results of the bank-level analysis show even stronger reaction to the “no-shock”
event. Indeed, 15.7 percent (85 of 540) of the matched bank performance measures
showed economically significant deterioration.  In addition, 15.6 percent of the banks had
two or more performance ratios with economically significant changes.  In sum, up to 20
percent of the sample banks responded negatively to a local economic shock; however,
up to about 15 percent of matched banks responded negatively to a “no-shock event.”
These results suggest that factors other than the local economic shocks themselves
account for most of the deterioration in bank performance following the shocks.
A plot of the sum of ranks for the sample and matched banks helps us to visualize
the performance differences between the two groups.  Figure 3 charts the sum of ranks
for each set of county-aggregated sample and matched banks.  We order the county-
aggregated banks for each group from lowest to highest by sum of rank and plot on the
vertical axis the cumulative percent of the sum of ranks and plot on the horizontal axis
the cumulative percent of counties.  The “no effect” line is a 45 degree line in which the
cumulative percentage of rank-sums is equivalent to the cumulative percentage of18
counties (or county-aggregate banks).  For example, if performance of all banks were
equal so that each bank had the same sum of ranks, then the cumulative percent of the
sum of ranks would correspond exactly to the cumulative percent of counties.  The
impact of the economic shock (or no economic shock) is measured by the degree that the
lines bow outward because banks that are affected the most by local economic shocks
account for a smaller share of the cumulative sum of ranks.  As Figure 3 illustrates, the
curves for both the “shock” counties and the matched or “no-shock” counties bow
outward.  The curve for the shock counties bows outward slightly more than the curve for
the no-shock counties, but the difference appears small.  A nearly identical chart emerges
when bank-level sum of ranks are plotted.
Are the sum of ranks of banks in counties that suffered economic shocks and the
banks in counties that did not suffer economic shocks statistically different?  To answer
this question, we conduct a Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the sum of ranks of the sample
banks versus the matched banks.  In contrast to the Figure 3, the rank-sum test requires
that both the sample and matched banks be ranked as one data set.  Intuitively, if local
economic shocks affect sample banks in shock counties while matched banks in counties
without economic shocks are largely unaffected, the sample banks should have the lowest
sum of ranks.  The null hypothesis, however, that the sum of ranks of the sample versus
matched banks are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance.  This
result suggests that bank performance in counties that suffered economic shocks is no
different from bank performance in counties that did not suffer economic shocks.
Additional t-tests confirm the result that the performance of sample and matched
banks are statistically indistinguishable.  For each of the four bank performance ratios,19
we computed the means of the ratio differences one year before and two years after the
economic shocks reported in Table 2 and 5.  The null hypothesis is that the mean
differences between the sample and matched banks are equal.  Each of the four t-tests are
statistically insignificant, implying that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  In other
words, performance of geographically concentrated banks exposed to local economic
shocks is no different than performance of geographically concentrated banks not
exposed to local economic shocks.  Simply put, banks with geographically concentrated
operations are not vulnerable to local economic shocks.  Again, these results hold for the
county-aggregated ratios and the individual bank ratios.
VI.  What Accounts for the Heterogeneity of Post-Shock Bank Performance?
   If performance of geographically concentrated banks exposed to local economic
shocks is essentially no more volatile than performance of geographically concentrated
banks not exposed to local economic shocks, why does performance at some banks
deteriorate significantly while other banks are unfazed?  Moreover, why do some of the
banks in the counties without economic shocks fare poorly?
To address these questions, we more closely analyzed the performance of some of
the outlier banks.  In particular, we examined the eight sample banks from Greene and
White counties in Georgia, and Lake County in California.  As Table 2 indicates,
aggregate performance of banks in Greene County deteriorated the most of all the banks
observed after its economic shock in the fourth quarter of 1991.  In contrast, banks in
Lake County were among the least insensitive to the economic shock in the third quarter
of 1991.  Finally, aggregate bank performance in White County deteriorated significantly20
after the fourth quarter of 1991 despite the absence of a local economic shock.  We may
be able to observe reasons for these disparate performances both within and across
counties by analyzing more closely the banks’ financial statements around the date of the
economic shock.
The deterioration in performance across the eight sample banks varied widely, as
illustrated in Figure 4.  Greensboro Bank in Greene County suffered the worst
performance, with ROA less than zero in each of the eight quarters following the
economic shock.  In addition, loan losses surged to a peak of 4.2 percent in the second
quarter of 1993.  The other two banks in Greene County—Citizens Union and Farmers
Bank—had relatively modest reactions to the economic shock.  Farmers Bank seemed to
have more difficulties before the economic shock; its loan losses and nonperforming
loans were relatively high prior to the fourth quarter of 1991.  The three banks in Lake
County California—Clear Lake Bank, Lake Community Bank, and Bank of Lake
County—sailed right through the local economic shock in the third quarter of 1991.
Earnings and asset quality were not affected.  Finally, performance of one the two banks
in White County, White City Bank, did deteriorate significantly after the fourth quarter of
1991, despite the lack of a local economic shock.  Loan losses surged about two years
after the “no-shock” date.  The bank began setting aside large amounts of provision
expense in the middle of 1992, anticipating the losses.  The other bank in White
County—First National Bank of White County—had no deterioration in performance
after the fourth quarter of 1991.
Different responses of banks in the three counties to local economic shocks may
be driven partly by differences in the severity and persistence of the unemployment rate21
shocks.  Several contradictions arise, however, with this explanation.  First, by
construction, banks in White County did not suffer a local economic shock.  The poor
performance of White County Bank had to be driven by some other factor.  Second, as
Figure 5 illustrates, the economic shock in Lake County was just as severe as the one in
Greene County.  Seasonally adjusted quarterly unemployment rates in Lake County
increased from 10 percent in the third quarter of 1991 to a peak of 14 percent in the
fourth quarter of 1992, and they did not drop under the 1991 level until the third quarter
of 1998.  The unemployment rate in Greene County stood at 6.4 percent in the fourth
quarter of 1991 and increased to a maximum of 11.2 percent in 1993.  The
unemployment rate fell under 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 1997.  Clearly both
counties encountered a severe and prolonged economic shock.  Finally, the persistence of
the unemployment shock had different effects on the banks within Greene County.
Greensboro Bank had a sharp drop in profitability and asset quality, yet deterioration in
performance at Citizens Union and Farmers Bank was much less severe.  Clearly other
factors were important in leading to the variation in performance across banks.
Another factor that might account for the differences in performance both within
and across counties is the credit risk exposure of each bank at the beginning of the local
economic shock.  Many of the asset quality problems that banks suffered in the late 1980s
into the early 1990s were in commercial real estate (identified in the call reports as
construction and land development and non-family non-residential loans secured by real
estate).  Perhaps banks with heightened exposure to commercial real estate performed the
worst.  Table 6 lists the loan composition of each of the eight banks as of their respective
dates of economic shocks.  The two banks that had the worst deterioration in22
performance—Greensboro and White County Banks—had ratios of commercial real
estate to total loans of 15 percent and 25 percent, respectively.  Other banks, however,
had similar or higher percentages of commercial real estate.  Indeed, the Bank of Lake
County and Lake Community Bank had 63 percent and 30 percent ratios, respectively.
Performance of those banks was not affected by the high concentration of commercial
real estate.  In addition, the two other banks in Greene County had loan portfolios similar
to that of Greensboro Bank.  Initial loan concentrations cannot explain the divergent
performances.  The poor performance of Greensboro Bank can be traced primarily to loan
losses in commercial real estate and commercial loans (commercial and industrial loans
not secured by real estate).  Figure 6 plots loan loss rates by loan category.  Despite being
as heavily (or more heavily) exposed to commercial and commercial real estate lending,
both Citizens Union and Farmers Bank avoided the loan losses of Greensboro Bank.
A final possibility that we consider is the organizational structure of the banks.
Banks that are part of multi-bank holding companies might behave differently than other
banks.  Holding company management, for example, may allow one bank to operate in a
specialized manner, knowing that other banks serve as natural hedges.  Holding company
affiliation, therefore, may make the bank more vulnerable to local market risk.
7  Of the
eight sample banks, four were part of multibank holding companies as of December 31,
1991.  These included Greensboro, Farmers, Bank of Lake County, and First National
Bank of White County.  Of those four, Greensboro is the only one that experienced poor
performance after the economic shock.  In addition, Greensboro Bank was part of a two-
bank holding company; the other bank was located in Baldwin County Georgia, just23
south of Greene County.  The possibility is remote that such a small holding company
could afford to have its banks specialize to such a degree.
In addition to looking at patterns at outlier banks, we ran regressions on all the
103 sample banks to attempt to explain the variations in performance.  In particular we
ran four regressions of the following type:
            CRE Share BHC TC BankPerf 4 3 2 1 0 (2)
where BankPerf is the average value of each of the nine bank performance ratios less the
peer ratios two years after the economic shock, minus the average value of each of the
four bank performance ratios less the peer ratios one year before the shock.  TC is the
total cost of the economic shock as measured in equation (1).  BHC is an indicator
variable of the holding company status of each bank at the time of the shock with a value
of 1 indicating a multibank holding company affiliation and a value of 0 indicating either
no holding company affiliation or a single-bank holding company affiliation.  Share is a
measure of the concentration of the loan portfolio at the time of the shock.  It is the sum
of squares of the real estate, consumer, commercial and agricultural loan shares.  Higher
values of Share result from less diversified loan portfolios.  Finally, CRE is the
percentage of commercial real estate loans in the loan portfolio at the time of the shock.
We expect each of these variables to be positively correlated with deterioration in asset
quality and earnings.
Regression results confirm the randomness in post-shock bank performance.
None of the regression results (not reported) are robust.  Variables are never statistically
significant across the regressions.  Even the variables that are statistically significant have
                                                                                                                                                
7 Of course, a multibank holding company affiliation may also make a bank less vulnerable to local market24
the theoretically unexpected signs.  In addition the r-squared values are low, ranging from
1 percent to 12 percent.
In sum, the weight of the evidence points to idiosyncratic risk as the key factor
explaining the divergent performance patterns of the sample banks exposed to economic
shocks.  Neither the length nor severity of the economic shock, the initial exposure to
credit risk, nor the holding company structure of the bank accounts for the observed
differences.  Five of the six banks in Greene and Lake counties fared the downturn
(reasonably) well.  Only Greensboro Bank suffered significant deterioration.  The
indication is that Greensboro Bank was exposed to commercial lending projects that
defaulted.  It appears, however, that any of the banks in Greene or Lake counties could
have fared just as poorly if a few loan customers had defaulted.  Indeed, despite the
absence of a local economic shock, White County Bank suffered high losses from
commercial and commercial real estate lending.  On the other hand, the First National
Bank of White County avoided such high losses.  Additional insights could be gleaned if
we knew whether the loans that defaulted in Greene and White County banks were local
loans.  Unfortunately, records with the relevant information no longer exist at the
appropriate supervisory agencies.
VII.  Conclusion
Community banks with geographically concentrated operations may be exposed
to significant local market risk.  We find, however, that this risk factor is small.
Performance at geographically concentrated banks that suffered local economic shocks is
                                                                                                                                                
risk because the bank can engage more easily in loan participations and other measures of financial
diversification.25
no worse than the performance of banks that did not experience local economic shocks.
About 20 percent of the banks exposed to negative economic shocks suffered significant
deterioration in asset quality and earnings performance—about the same percentage of
deterioration at banks not exposed to local economic shocks.
The difference in performance between banks with good and poor post-shock
performance is not attributable to the length or severity of the economic shock, the initial
exposure of the bank to credit risk, nor the holding company structure of the bank.
Because the performance of community banks varies so widely, we conclude that
idiosyncratic risk is a more important risk factor than local market risk.  That is, banks
are exposed to default risk from at any given time from their loan customers.  If a few
large customers default, bank performance may deteriorate significantly, regardless of the
local economic conditions.
These findings have three policy implications.  First, bank supervisors need not
require geographically concentrated community banks to take additional measures
relative to more diversified banks to reduce local market risk.  Second, as community
banks take advantage of the recent relaxation of U.S. branching restrictions in the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, risk reduction through
geographic diversification is likely to be small.  This result is similar to the study from
Emmons et al. (2001), which finds that risk-reduction from bank mergers comes from
scale effects, not geographical diversification.  Third, bank supervisors should not rely
systematically on county economic data to better understand bank performance.  County
economic data add few marginal benefits in predicting and even explaining community
bank performance.  A steep rise in county unemployment rates may or may not lead to a26
deterioration in bank performance.  In addition, a bank may deteriorate even if local
unemployment rates remain stable.  Broader economic data appear to be more useful to
supervisors than county-level data.27
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1 Edwards IL 1990 4 2 6.00 10.64 9.99 3,568
2 Johnson IL 1990 4 3 10.61 12.76 7.66 4,168
3 Union IL 1990 4 4 9.98 12.19 7.43 8,016
4 Murray OK 1990 4 2 7.48 10.28 7.04 5,302
5 Pawnee OK 1990 4 4 6.25 9.48 6.37 7,527
6 Gallatin IL 1991 1 2 9.02 11.05 6.10 2,965
7 Jefferson IL 1991 1 5 11.29 13.10 6.78 17,470
8 Okfuskee OK 1991 1 3 7.31 9.97 6.42 4,341
9 Calhoun GA 1991 2 3 5.20 11.01 12.01 2,115
10 Elbert GA 1991 2 2 6.18 9.53 6.55 8,723
11 Lake CA 1991 3 3 9.97 11.99 6.74 23,657
12 Early GA 1991 3 2 6.05 9.93 7.77 5,236
13 Meriwether GA 1991 3 3 6.18 9.98 7.87 9,326
14 Mitchell GA 1991 3 3 7.01 10.73 9.25 9,034
15 Polk GA 1991 3 2 7.97 11.39 9.76 16,066
16 Seminole GA 1991 3 2 5.60 10.07 8.60 4,107
17 Telfair GA 1991 3 4 5.04 9.02 6.20 4,724
18 Troup GA 1991 3 4 6.51 9.47 6.12 24,668
19 Atkinson GA 1991 4 2 5.10 9.44 7.29 2,461
20 Bacon GA 1991 4 2 4.75 8.88 6.14 4,291
21 Crisp GA 1991 4 2 5.52 9.30 6.47 8,562
22 Franklin GA 1991 4 4 5.72 9.44 6.65 8,195
23 Gilmer GA 1991 4 2 6.92 9.78 6.45 6,231
24 Greene GA 1991 4 3 6.37 10.24 8.50 5,182
25 Rabun GA 1991 4 3 5.21 9.94 8.61 5,678
26 Talbot GA 1991 4 2 5.30 9.30 6.68 2,638
27 Terrell GA 1991 4 2 4.80 9.60 8.02 4,631
28 Toombs GA 1991 4 3 6.14 9.76 7.24 10,750
29 Clarke IA 1992 2 2 5.07 9.04 6.22 4,383
30 Calhoun IL 1992 3 2 10.09 14.87 18.11 2,754
31 Pulaski IL 1992 4 3 11.77 14.57 11.23 2,816
32 Mcintosh OK 1992 4 2 8.23 10.53 6.31 6,573
33 Evans GA 1993 1 2 6.37 10.11 8.10 4,128
34 Adams IA 1995 4 2 3.23 9.40 9.03 2,356
35 Wilcox GA 1996 2 5 6.46 10.62 9.62 3,302
36 Towns GA 1996 3 2 6.35 9.38 6.01 3,511
37 Jasper IL 1996 3 3 6.99 10.82 9.59 4,475
38 Washington GA 1997 1 2 6.20 9.88 7.55 9,528
Table 1
Selected Counties with an Economic Shock
This table lists the selected counties that suffered economic shocks sometime in the 1990s, sorted by the quarter of the 
shock.  At least two community banks with all deposits derived from a single county had to reside in a given county.  
The shock year and shock quarter indicate the quarter in which the leading unemployment rate--the average 
unemployment rate over the next four quarters--exceeded the current unemployment rate such that the total cost of 
unemployment as described in equation (1) was 6 or greater.  The size of the labor force in the quarter of the economic 
shock is also listed.  Most of the shocks occurred in the state of Georgia around the 1990-1991 recession.Sum of
County State Difference Rank Difference Rank Difference Rank Difference Rank Ranks
1 Greene GA 0.8 1 1.6 1 0.5 2 -0.9 1 5
2 Meriwether GA 0.4 4 0.6 10 1.1 1 -0.7 2 17
3 Calhoun GA 0.4 3 1.4 4 0.4 3 -0.3 7 17
4 Gilmer GA 0.3 8 1.2 6 0.2 14 -0.4 5 33
5 Wilcox GA 0.1 16 1.5 2 0.4 4 -0.3 11 33
6 Talbot GA 0.2 9 0.9 7 0.1 20 -0.5 3 39
7 Elbert GA 0.2 12 0.6 9 0.2 11 -0.31 8 40
8 Gallatin IL 0.3 5 0.4 13 0.3 7 -0.22 15 40
9 Jefferson IL 0.6 2 0.0 23 0.4 5 -0.23 13 43
10 Okfuskee OK 0.1 17 1.5 3 0.21 8 -0.20 17 45
11 Bacon GA 0.3 6 0.2 18 0.21 9 -0.22 14 47
12 Johnson IL 0.3 7 0.21 15 0.15 15 0.01 26 63
13 Mitchell GA 0.15 14 -0.38 32 0.35 6 -0.26 12 64
14 Rabun GA 0.17 10 0.07 20 0.14 17 -0.19 18 65
15 Washington GA -0.02 29 0.14 19 0.21 10 -0.16 19 77
16 Atkinson GA 0.08 22 0.20 16 0.06 21 -0.13 20 79
17 Early GA 0.09 20 0.16 17 0.10 18 -0.06 24 79
18 Towns GA 0.00 25 0.52 11 0.02 24 -0.12 21 81
19 Crisp GA 0.16 13 0.43 12 -0.09 30 0.04 27 82
20 Terrell GA -0.01 28 -0.39 33 0.17 13 -0.30 9 83
21 Troup GA 0.06 23 0.63 8 0.02 23 0.10 30 84
22 Edwards IL -0.07 32 1.31 5 -2.64 38 -0.28 10 85
23 Pulaski IL -0.06 31 0.01 24 0.01 27 -0.44 4 86
24 Telfair GA 0.08 21 -0.04 25 0.02 25 -0.21 16 87
25 Jasper IL 0.09 19 -0.20 29 0.17 12 0.13 32 92
26 Seminole GA 0.05 24 -0.13 27 0.04 22 -0.11 22 95
27 Union IL 0.10 18 -0.13 28 -0.03 28 -0.07 23 97
28 Murray OK 0.17 11 0.03 21 -0.44 35 0.11 31 98
29 Toombs GA -0.01 27 -1.05 37 -0.13 32 -0.33 6 102
30 Adams IA 0.00 26 0.02 22 0.01 26 0.04 29 103
31 Polk GA -0.45 37 0.26 14 0.14 16 0.32 36 103
32 Clarke IA -0.03 30 -0.30 31 0.08 19 0.04 28 108
33 Pawnee OK 0.15 15 -0.68 36 -0.41 34 0.19 35 120
34 Franklin GA -0.08 33 -0.10 26 -0.10 31 0.15 34 124
35 Evans GA -0.12 34 -0.20 30 -0.09 29 0.13 33 126
36 Mcintosh OK -0.20 35 -0.44 34 -0.57 36 -0.02 25 130
37 Lake CA -0.24 36 -1.45 38 -0.32 33 0.55 37 144
38 Calhoun IL -1.13 38 -0.56 35 -1.51 37 0.63 38 148
Table 2
This table lists the key performance ratios of banks (aggregated by county) from the 38 sample counties that experienced
economic shocks in the 1990s. The banks are ranked in ascending order by the sum of ranks. The four performance ratios
are provision expense, nonperforming loans to total loans, loan losses to total loans, and return on assets. The difference
reported for each ratio is the average value of the performance ratio relative to the peer value in the quarter of the shock and
two years following the shock, minus the average performance ratio relative to the peer value four quarters prior to the
economic shock. Larger values (larger negative values for ROA) indicate that the economic shock led to greater
deterioration at the sample bank. We measured economic significance by comparing the difference in the ratio to the
difference between the median performance ratio of a CAMELS 2-rated bank and a CAMELS 3-rated bank as listed in
Table 3. Differences in performance ratios that are greater than or equal to one are shaded in gray, suggesting that
performance of banks in those counties deteriorated significantly following the economic shock.
Loan Losses ROA Provision Expense Nonperf.  LoansCAMELS Number of Provision Nonperforming Loans Loan Losses
'A' Rating Observations Expense to Total Loans to Total Loans
2 8231 0.15 1.10 0.13
3 2698 0.34 2.44 0.49
Difference 0.19 1.34 0.35
Performance Ratio (%)
CAMELS Number of




CAMELS Benchmarks for Economic significance
Performance Ratio (%)
Table 3
This table computes benchmarks for economic significance by calculating the median differences in 
performance ratios between CAMELS 2-rated banks and CAMELS 3-rated banks.  Economic significance 
benchmarks for the asset quality ratios--provision expense, nonperforming loans, and loan losses--are derived 
by separating banks in the sample based on the 'A' (Asset quality) rating, while the earnings ratio benchmark--
return on assets--is derived by separating banks in the sample based on the 'E' (Earnings) rating.  The results 
suggest that a 19 basis point difference in provision expense, a 134 basis point increase in nonperforming 
loans, and a 35 basis point increase in loan losses are economically significant changes in asset quality.  In 















1 Edwards IL 1990 4 Brown  IL 3 6.10 6.44 0.26
2 Johnson IL 1990 4 Henderson  IL 4 6.40 7.26 1.16
3 Union IL 1990 4 Jo  Daviess IL 7 5.11 6.39 1.14
4 Murray OK 1990 4 Alfalfa  OK 4 2.90 2.66 0.00
5 Pawnee OK 1990 4 Canadian  OK 9 4.93 4.82 0.00
6 Gallatin IL 1991 1 Carroll  IL 7 6.87 7.74 1.49
7 Jefferson IL 1991 1 Cass  IL 6 9.73 8.78 0.00
8 Okfuskee OK 1991 1 Beaver  OK 2 3.08 3.56 0.48
9 Calhoun GA 1991 2 Bleckley  GA 2 5.18 4.55 0.00
10 Elbert GA 1991 2 Dade  GA 2 6.15 5.61 0.00
11 Lake  CA 1991 3 San Luis Obispo  CA 7 6.23 6.85 0.68
12 Early GA 1991 3 Catoosa  GA 2 4.49 5.12 0.64
13 Meriwether GA 1991 3 Jenkins  GA 2 4.97 5.61 0.64
14 Mitchell GA 1991 3 Laurens  GA 5 3.84 5.07 1.24
15 Polk GA 1991 3 Lumpkin GA 2 6.28 4.85 0.00
16 Seminole GA 1991 3 Putnam  GA 2 6.30 4.37 0.00
17 Telfair GA 1991 3 Pulaski  GA 2 5.89 5.07 0.00
18 Troup GA 1991 3 Brooks  GA 3 3.11 4.04 0.92
19 Atkinson GA 1991 4 White  GA 2 6.33 4.81 0.00
20 Bacon GA 1991 4 Wilkinson GA 3 5.31 6.03 0.70
21 Crisp GA 1991 4 Bryan  GA 2 4.25 5.49 1.25
22 Franklin GA 1991 4 Habersham  GA 3 4.64 5.04 0.39
23 Gilmer GA 1991 4 Henry  GA 3 3.98 5.13 1.14
24 Greene GA 1991 4 Irwin  GA 2 4.25 5.54 1.29
25 Rabun GA 1991 4 Oconee  GA 2 2.89 3.85 0.96
26 Talbot GA 1991 4 Upson  GA 2 4.67 5.03 0.36
27 Terrell GA 1991 4 Stephens  GA 3 6.41 6.26 0.00
28 Toombs GA 1991 4 Tift  GA 4 7.44 7.38 0.00
29 Clarke IA 1992 2 Pottawattamie  IA 7 4.92 4.40 0.00
30 Calhoun IL 1992 3 Richland  IL 2 5.39 5.01 0.00
31 Pulaski IL 1992 4 Morgan  IL 5 5.73 4.89 0.00
32 Mcintosh OK 1992 4 Osage  OK 4 5.43 5.72 0.29
33 Evans GA 1993 1 Jackson  GA 3 5.01 4.46 0.00
34 Adams IA 1995 4 Kossuth  IA 5 3.52 2.81 0.00
35 Wilcox GA 1996 2 Berrien  GA 3 4.32 5.42 1.10
36 Towns GA 1996 3 Bartow  GA 3 5.25 5.02 0.00
37 Jasper IL 1996 3 Scott  IL 2 6.02 6.65 0.52
38 Washington GA 1997 1 Bulloch  GA 4 2.72 3.28 0.55
Matched Counties
Table 4
Matches for Counties with an Economic Shock
This table matches each of the 38 selected counties that suffered an economic shock with a county that did not suffer an
economic shock during the 1990s. Each county selected as a match had to be from the same state as the sample bank, had to
have two banks with all deposits in the county, and had to have a total cost from unemployment of less than two. The date
of the economic "no-shock" for the matched counties is the same as the their sample counterparts. For example, the three
banks in the county of Brown, Illinois are assumed to have experienced a "no-shock" event during the fourth quarter of
1990, the same as the shock date of Edwards County, Illinois. Bank performance ratios are then computed two years ahead
of the "no-shock" date and compared with performance ratios one year before the "no-shock" date.
Sample CountiesSum of
County State Difference Rank Difference Rank Difference Rank Difference Rank Ranks
1 White GA 0.59 1 0.77 6 0.42 8 -0.69 1 16
2 Lumpkin GA 0.37 2 1.80 2 0.28 9 -0.23 8 21
3 Osage OK 0.36 3 0.06 25 0.65 7 -0.61 2 37
4 Morgan IL 0.12 10 0.86 3 0.00 18 -0.09 15 46
5 Tift GA 0.15 8 0.59 9 0.20 10 0.05 24 51
6 Cass IL 0.05 14 -0.20 32 0.99 2 -0.47 4 52
7 Beaver OK 0.16 7 -1.53 37 0.82 5 -0.30 6 55
8 Dade GA 0.18 6 0.38 12 -0.17 27 -0.15 13 58
9 Stephens GA 0.04 16 0.84 4 0.00 19 0.04 23 62
10 Brown IL -0.01 24 -0.18 31 0.94 3 -0.42 5 63
11 Upson GA 0.03 18 0.76 7 0.11 12 0.09 26 63
12 Jo Daviess  IL -0.02 26 -0.11 29 1.24 1 -0.23 9 65
13 Bleckley GA 0.19 5 0.47 10 -0.08 25 0.07 25 65
14 Canadian OK 0.19 4 0.03 26 -0.25 29 -0.27 7 66
15 Brooks GA 0.08 12 0.32 14 0.09 13 0.14 28 67
16 Alfalfa OK 0.00 22 0.59 8 -0.72 36 -0.50 3 69
17 Irwin GA 0.01 19 0.37 13 0.01 17 0.00 22 71
18 Wilkinson GA 0.04 17 0.44 11 -0.12 26 -0.01 20 74
19 Habersham GA 0.01 20 0.19 18 0.03 15 -0.01 21 74
20 Richland IL -0.03 27 0.12 22 0.04 14 -0.17 12 75
21 Catoosa GA 0.09 11 0.19 19 0.02 16 0.19 30 76
22 Kossuth IA 0.05 15 0.07 24 -0.03 22 -0.08 16 77
23 Carroll IL -0.04 28 0.00 27 0.71 6 -0.07 18 79
24 Scott IL 0.14 9 0.19 20 -0.02 21 0.15 29 79
25 Pulaski GA 0.07 13 -0.28 34 -0.05 23 -0.20 11 81
26 Pottawattamie IA 0.01 21 0.08 23 0.12 11 0.13 27 82
27 Putnam GA -0.09 30 2.48 1 -0.57 35 -0.06 19 85
28 Jackson GA -0.57 34 0.79 5 -0.47 32 -0.07 17 88
29 Oconee GA -0.01 23 0.20 17 -0.01 20 0.20 31 91
30 Laurens GA -0.01 25 0.26 16 -0.17 28 0.23 32 101
31 Bulloch GA -0.43 32 -0.07 28 -0.49 33 -0.23 10 103
32 Bartow GA -0.61 35 0.13 21 -0.52 34 -0.09 14 104
33 Bryan GA -0.63 36 -3.92 38 0.89 4 0.41 34 112
34 Jenkins GA -0.21 31 0.32 15 -0.39 30 0.63 37 113
35 Henry GA -0.06 29 -0.17 30 -0.07 24 0.25 33 116
36 San Luis Obispo  CA -0.52 33 -0.94 35 -0.41 31 0.53 35 134
37 Berrien GA -1.01 37 -0.22 33 -0.86 37 0.60 36 143
38 Henderson IL -1.67 38 -1.41 36 -2.71 38 1.21 38 150
Table 5
This table lists the key performance ratios of county-aggregated banks from the 38 match counties that did not experienced
economic shocks in the 1990s. The banks are sorted in ascending order by their sum of ranks. The four performance ratios are
provision expense, nonperforming loans to total loans, loan losses to total loans, and return on assets. The difference reported is
the average value of the performance ratio relative to the peer value in the quarter of the "no-shock" and two years following the
no-shock, minus the average performance ratio relative to the peer value four quarters prior to the economic no-shock. Larger
values (larger negative values for ROA) indicate that the no-shock event led to greater deterioration at the match bank. We
measured economic significance by comparing the difference in the ratio to the difference between the median performance ratio
of a CAMELS 2-rated bank and a CAMELS 3-rated bank as listed in Table 3. Differences in performance ratios that are greater
than or equal to one are shaded in gray, suggesting that performance of banks in those counties deteriorated significantly following
the economic no-shock.
Loan Losses ROA Provision Expense Nonperf.  LoansCommercial 
Real Estate
Commercial 
& Industrial Consumer 1-4 Family Other
Greene County (December 31, 1991)
Greensboro Bank 15 6 33 41 5
Citizens Union Bank 14 6 11 66 3
Farmers Bank 19 14 20 33 14
Lake County (September 30, 1991)
Bank of Lake County 63 11 8 3 15
Lake Community Bank 30 11 12 41 6
Clear Lake Bank 20 10 20 43 7
White County (December 31, 1991)
First National Bank of White County 32 4 12 30 22
White County Bank 25 26 23 22 4
Table 6
Loan Composition as a Percent of Total Loans of Selected Banks
Loan composition on the eve of an economic shock may help to explain why performance of certain banks  
deteriorated in response to the economic shock while other banks were unaffected.  Because commercial real 
estate was hit particulary hard during the late 1980s and early 1990s, we might expect banks with heavy reliance 
on commercial real estate loans to perform worse than banks with less exposure to that market.  However, the 
worst performing bank--Greensboro Bank--had a modest concentration of commercial real estate loans.  In 
addition, banks in Lake County were heavily exposed to commecial real estate and commercial and industrial 
loans, yet performance of those banks remained strong during the local economic downturn.Figure 1
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Figure 1 plots the total cost of the change in the unemployment rate from four percent in a given quarter to the leading unemployment rate as
measured along the horizontal axis. In this example, TC1 rises to 2 as the leading unemployment rate increases from 4 percent to 6 percent and
above. TC2 increases exponentially as the unemployment rate rises above 6 percent. If the unemployment rate rises from 4 percent to 9 percent,
for example, TC2 is (9-6)1.5, or 5.2. The total cost from the increase in unemployment (TC) is the sum of TC1 and TC2, or 2 + 5.2 = 7.2. In this
case, the county would be classified as having suffered an economic shock because the total cost exceeds the threshold value of 6. Given an
initial unemployment rate of 4 percent, if the leading unemployment rate increases to 8.52 percent or above, we classify the unemployment rate






Each of the panels in Figure 2 plots the difference between county-aggregated bank performance ratios and peer bank ratios both before and after a 
local economic shock for the counties of Greene, Meriwether, Lake and Calhoun.  The economic shock occurs at quarter '0.'  An increase in asset 
quality ratios and a decrease in ROA following the shock indicates greater deterioration in bank performance.  These charts show that banks in Greene 
and Meriwether counties deteriorated the most following the economic shock.  Banks in Lake County were seemingly unaffected.  Banks in Calhoun 
County appear to have deteriorated before the economic shock.
Bank Performance from Selected Counties Before and After an Economic Shock
Return on Assets
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As Tables 2 and 5 show, county-aggregated banks in the sample and matched counties were ranked based on four performance measures.  The ranks were then 
summed.  Lower ranks indicate worse performance.  If banks were not affected at all by local economic performance, then the cumulative sum of ranks would 
correspond exactly with the cumulative percent of counties, resulting in the 45 degree line titled "No Effect."  In other words, 10 percent of the counties would 
account for 10 percent of the sum of ranks, and so on.  If banks are affected by local economic performance, then the ones that are affected the most account for a 
smaller share of the cumulative sum of ranks, making the curve bow downward.  We find that the cumulative sum of ranks curve for the banks in the shock 
counties does bow downward slightly more than the sum of ranks for the banks in the shock counties, but the Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the difference 




Loan Losses to Total Loans
Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans
These charts plot the time series of bank performance ratios in selected counties one year before and two years following a local economic shock for banks in Greene, White and 
Lake counties.  These banks and counties are chosen to contrast the variation in bank performance both within and across counties.  Of the three banks in Greene County, only 
Greensboro bank showed significant deterioration in performance.  All three banks in Lake County were essentially unaffected by the local downturn.  One bank in White County-
White County Bank--experienced deterioration in performance despite the absence of a local economic shock; the other bank in that county showed no signs of deterioration. 
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Clear Lake Lake Community Bank of Lake CountyFigure 5






















This chart plots seasonally-adjusted quarterly unemployment rates for the counties of Greene and White Georgia 
and Lake California.  The local economic shock, which is indicated by the gray vertical bar, appears to beat least 
as intense and persistent in Lake County as in Greene County.  Indeed, White County did not suffer a local 
economic shock.  The length and persistence of the shock, therefore, cannot explain the relatively poor 
performance of banks in Green and White counties.Loan Loss Ratios by Type of Loan for Banks in Greene County, Georgia
Figure 6
Of the three sample banks in Greene County, only Greensboro Bank experienced significant deterioration following the local economic shock, which occurred at time 0 in the charts 
above.  Plots of the loan losses by loan type reveal that high charge-offs in both commercial and commercial real estate accounted for poor perforamance at Greensboro Bank.  
Citizens Union and Farmers had commercial loan concentrations equal to or exceeding that of Greensboro Bank, yet their performance remained sound through the local economic 
shock.
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